

The Road to Hell: Race, Paternalism, and Political Behavior

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Abstract

Scholars of racial and ethnic politics have largely overlooked an important race-related disposition that strongly impacts salient policy preferences: racialized paternalism. This is a consequential and common disposition; rooted in a desire to improve outcomes for an out-group and a belief that the out-group is incapable of improving their own outcomes without interference. Importantly, I argue that this attitude is not motivated by animus. This leads these paternalists to endorse restrictive — albeit well-intentioned — policies imposed upon the out-group, which they hope will help the group overcome deficiencies. I argue that this construct is related to but distinct from a more general and race neutral paternalism. With data from two national surveys, I assess the impact of this novel construct. I demonstrate that an original Black Paternalism scale is associated with higher support for policies that are racialized and paternalistic, but not for policies that are merely racialized. Further with a survey experiment on state takeovers of local school boards, I demonstrate that racialized paternalism motivates significantly higher support for this policy when applied to a Black as opposed to a White school board. Finally, I show that a measure of general paternalism leads to large shifts in public opinion on policies that are paternalistic, regardless of if they are racialized or not.

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Introduction

In 1999 the Michigan state legislature disbanded the democratically elected school board in the city of Detroit and replaced it with members selected by the city's mayor and the state superintendent of education. The city, as a whole, and especially the schools had suffered from budget shortfalls for years, but the move to dissolve the school board was an extreme step, one used only in rare circumstances. Rarity notwithstanding, evidence suggests that incidences of state takeover are on the rise and there is a troubling pattern behind these interventions (Morel, 2017). To that point, the Detroit school board was not the only Michigan local governing body to find itself suddenly stripped of the power invested in them by the public. Three cities —Benton Harbor, Highland Park, and Flint— also lost their governing power to the state. These localities share one important demographic feature: they all have a plurality of Black citizens in a majority White state. Prior research on takeovers of elected governing bodies demonstrates that race plays a role in which bodies are targeted, even when accounting for other important factors like the financial situation or performance of these governmental entities (Morel, 2017). However, our understanding of racial attitudes and how they impact political outcomes does not provide a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon.

The literature on race and political behavior often makes an explicit assumption that the main driver of racially biased and discriminatory outcomes is animus toward a particular out-group (Allport, 1978; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears & Henry, 2003), but this need not be the case. The takeover of largely local governing bodies that were largely comprised of African American elected officials in Michigan provides an example where the animus approach might miss some crucial element of support. Prior work proposes that these takeovers are targeted towards African Americans disproportionately and are intended to reduce the political power of the group (Morel, 2017).¹ However, this explanation seems less convincing in the case of these Michigan cities (except for Flint), given that the takeovers were set in motion by the state's Democratic governor who benefitted immensely from the political power of Black people in these localities, since Black voters and politicians were almost exclusively co-partisans. Importantly, these takeover efforts are quite frequently framed and justified as beneficial to the Black community. This is not to say that the elites who trot out this rationale are always being sincere and genuinely want what is best for African Americans; there is clear evidence that many elites do want to reduce the political power of out-groups (Rocha & Matsubayashi, 2013; Hicks, McKee, &

¹Morel notes that these takeovers can under certain circumstances increase the political power of minorities, as was the case for the Latino community in Central Falls, Rhode Island. But his data on takeovers suggests this is much less likely to be the case for largely Black school districts.

Smith, 2016). But this framing may be successful in building a broad coalition of support for these policies in the mass public, including among those who do not harbor ill will towards Black people and are sincere in their desire to improve conditions for the group.

I argue that a crucial element of support for these takeovers, and several other important contemporary race-related policies, is a *racialized paternalism*. This is a group specific mass attitude, motivated by a desire to improve outcomes for an out-group and a belief that the out-group is incapable of improving their own outcomes without interference. Racialized paternalism is not rooted in animus; to the contrary, its adherents feel genuinely positive toward the out-group, but doubt the capacity of the out-group to handle its own affairs. Notably, though racialized paternalism is related to a general and non-racialized paternalism, I argue that racialized paternalism operates differently.

The Flint case makes clear that, no matter the impetus behind the move, the loss of local control can lead to disastrous consequences. The city's state appointed manager approved a cost-cutting measure which made the Flint River the main source of water for the city. This new water source led to a large increase in the lead content of the city's water supply, poisoning thousands and killing at least 12.²

Extant scholarship on race and politics from across the social sciences has largely failed to account for racialized paternalism. From the definition of prejudice itself, to the large literature on modern and symbolic racism and even on to much of the more recent work on the impact of implicit racial attitudes; all of these efforts examine attitudes borne out of spite. This focus is warranted, given how many Americans still express an unmistakable hostility toward out-groups, and the clear connection between those feelings and discriminatory behavior (Tesler, 2012; Lajevardi & Oskooii, 2018). However, the story of racial attitudes and how they impact policy preferences certainly does not end with those who express animosity towards other racial groups. But virtually all common approaches to understanding the impact of attitudes about race on public opinion fail to explore the possibility that some of those who endorse discrimination may be spurred not by animus, but by their affinity for an out-group.

This theoretical construct is valuable for a number of reasons. First, it provides an explanation for why many who express positive feelings toward Black people as a group might still endorse policies that are harmful or discriminatory towards the group. This framework also provides intuition about when a crucial group of "moderates" is likely to side with racial conservatives (on policy that is racialized and paternalistic). Finally, this theory underlies the construction of a novel and consequential measure, the Black paternalism scale. This measure is not easily conflated with partisan or ideological identities,

²<https://www.reuters.com>

an important critique often leveled against animus based racial attitudes like racial resentment (Carmines & Sniderman, 1997; Feldman & Huddy, 2005).

In this paper, I expound upon a theory of racialized paternalism and how it impacts political attitudes and behavior. I test two original measures, the Black paternalism scale and the general paternalism scale, on two national online surveys. I validate the measurement strategy by demonstrating that both exert a considerable and robust impact on support for policies that are both racialized towards African Americans and paternalistic. Further, I demonstrate that these relationships persist above and beyond the impact of other relevant dispositions including racial resentment and authoritarianism. I also provide evidence of discriminant validity, for both constructs. I confirm in a pre-registered study that racialized paternalism is primed by race: the Black Paternalism scale is significantly associated with higher support for takeovers of largely Black school boards relative to an, otherwise identical, White school board. But, as expected, the same is not true of the general paternalism measure which predicts support for the takeover regardless of race.

Literature Review

Prioritization of Negative Affect as a Driver of Racial Attitudes

A key assumption made by scholars who have explored racial attitudes and how they motivate public opinion is that the valence of affect for a group will consistently drive preferences for policy toward that group in a consistent direction. This affect paradigm sees negative feelings toward an out-group as the natural precursor to discrimination and positive feelings toward a group as a precursor to positive intergroup outcomes (Clifford & Piston, 2017). For this reason, researchers interested in understanding the impact of racial attitudes on meaningful political outcomes have prioritized the role of racial animus as the primary motivator of discriminatory behavior. Allport, in one of the earliest attempts to reckon with this construct, defines prejudice as "antipathy based on faulty or inflexible generalization", making a negative affectual charge a necessary component of prejudice (Allport, 1979, p. 9). Much of the subsequent literature follows Allport's lead and prioritizes the role of negative affect as a necessary condition for prejudice.

The closely interwoven constructs of symbolic racism, modern racism, and racial resentment, have been the hallmark of political science work on how racial attitudes translate into political behavior over the past 40 years. Their creators have described the survey items in these various constructs as tapping into a "subtle hostility" and "a fusion of anti-Black affect and individualism" (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears & Henry 2003). The

questions were specifically designed to assess a dislike of African Americans paired with a belief that the group violates traditional norms. Other scholars have established that anger is the emotional foundation of racial resentment, whereas old fashioned biological racism is motivated by disgust, both of which are negative emotions (Banks & Valentino, 2012). Similarly work on constructs like ethnocentrism, which has clear racial implications, has made use of differences in feeling thermometer ratings meant to capture negative views towards out-groups (Kam & Kinder, 2012).

Even scholars who have ventured beyond explicit measures have made use of implicit attitude tests that capture affective charges associated with specific out-groups (Kalmoe & Piston, 2013; Kinder & Ryan, 2015; Perez, 2016). The original IAT and many permutations focus on the immediate emotional charge following exposure to an out-group and assume that those who have more negative implicit associations with an out-group harbor an implicit bias against them (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). Though not all implicit measures are affect based the ones used most commonly to assess the impact of race bias, like the AMP or go-no go task, are (Pasek et. al. 2010; Nosek & Banaji, 2001).

A number of other approaches to examining racial attitudes have managed to avoid the dominant animus paradigm. Notably, Blumer's group conflict theory and variants thereof do not prioritize affect and focus on conflict over claim to material possessions, rights and resources (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). However, this conception still prioritizes explicit conflict, which is likely to co-occur with animosity (Jackman, 1994). Even important critiques of these approaches, like that of Bonilla-Silva (1997), which notes the limitations of an understanding of racism rooted in mere interpersonal hostility, pushes scholars towards thinking about race as a structural phenomenon, instead of exploring the connection between neutral or positive affect for a group and racial bias.

Though the lion's share of attention has been paid to negative affect there have been efforts undertaken to explore the way that positive affect for out-groups impacts political behavior. However, this literature makes the same assumption and focuses exclusively on how positive affect and racial sympathy for an out-group are influential in driving attitudes on racialized policy (Katz & Hass, 1988; Chudy, 2017). These authors take the positive affect as a signal of genuine racial liberalism and do not seem to question the ways this positive affect might be complicated by other attitudes.

Stereotype Content Model and Paternalism

Despite the inattention from scholars of race and politics, there is reason to believe that the counterintuitive pairing of positive affect and racial prejudice can be found under the

right circumstances. The stereotype content model from psychology posits that judgments about social groups fall along two key axes, competence and warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). Though most of the work on racial attitudes looks at the congruent pairings, i.e. low competence/warmth and high competence/warmth, there are other possible combinations that can produce unique and consequential emotions toward out-groups. Specifically, groups that are seen as high in warmth and low in competence can engender emotions such as pity or sympathy (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). Fiske and her colleagues find that several groups, such as the elderly, poor, or disabled persons meet this criterion. As such they are commonly seen as incompetent despite the fact that these groups are still viewed with warm affect overall. It is possible that many individuals feel similarly about specific out-groups.

And indeed, subsequent work demonstrates that the pairing of positive affect and negative stereotypes towards women is common and meaningful for gender relations. These scholars coined the term benevolent sexism to describe a type of sexism that is not driven by negative affect or independent of affect all together, but instead is driven by positive affect (Glick & Fiske, 1996). The concept describes men (and notably many women as well) who feel positively toward women and seek to help them, but still harbor negative stereotypes about the group and desire for them to fill predetermined roles that undercut these efforts. Glick and Fiske (1996) note that there are multiple important sources of benevolent sexism but the most relevant for these purposes is protective paternalism. The construct has been validated, is common among representative samples of the public and research has shown that it can motivate support for outcomes that are actively harmful for women (Glick & Fiske, 2001; Viki, Abrams & Masser, 2004; Dardenne, Dumont & Bollier, 2007). There has been little to no exploration of the degree to which a similar disposition might exist with regard to racial attitudes.

Fiske and her colleagues note that the unique emotional charges of high warmth and low perceptions of competence for an out-group can lead to a paternalistic prejudice. Paternalism can mean different things in different circumstances but generally refers to the relationship between a parent and child, and specifically circumstances when this dynamic is foisted upon other situations. Dworkin (1972) specifically defines paternalism as "the interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of the person being coerced" (p. 61). Scholars of political theory, philosophy and law have taken time to explore the degree to which interference with one's personal liberty is appropriate and, as such, have had to tackle questions of when such paternalism is warranted in governance and when it is not (Mill, 1857; Arneson, 1980; Sanikowski, 1985; New, 1999; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). How-

ever, scholars of American political behavior have largely ignored paternalism as a general disposition, individual variation therein, and the way the disposition may be influenced or complicated by race.

Paternalism, Race and Politics

That said, some scholars of American politics more generally have found considerable evidence that paternalism is a potent force in American politics. This work is almost exclusively focused on the elite level, and not how this paternalism plays out among the mass public (Scott, 1998; Wacquant, 2009; Murakawa, 2014; Dionne, 2017). For example, Jackman (1994) explores the possibility that scholars of gender, class and race have, in their pursuit of outright conflict in intergroup relations, missed the dominant framework that superordinate groups have attempted to impose on their subordinates. She argues that paternalism is an ideology in the Marxist sense, one used to satiate subaltern groups and improve relations generally with these groups. In turn, these improved relations help to facilitate the exploitation and expropriation of resources from minorities to the dominant group (Jackman, 1994). Jackman claims that outright conflict between groups is rare and relations rife with conditional benevolence are a more sustainable strategy. She claims the goal of this paternalism is to reify the status quo and avoid costly and potentially successful challenges to the hierarchy, and that the benevolence often ascribed to the pater is an illusion. However, Jackman stops short of conceptualizing and measuring the disposition in the broader public, and assumes its existence from support of paternalist policy (1994).

Soss, Fording and Schram (2011) explore the rise of neoliberalism in the United States specifically with regard to poverty governance and find that race and paternalism are uniquely intertwined in how this has been implemented. Mead (1997) argued that the late 20th and early 21st centuries in American politics have featured a "new paternalism", referring specifically to efforts to reduce poverty through "directive and supervisory" policy. This project led to many reforms of government anti-poverty efforts, such as the end of AFDC and the introduction of work requirements for those receiving TANF. Soss, Fording and Schram (2011) claim this project is intended to remake the poor into ideal citizens, curing pathologies and teaching them to be self-regulating, and that the project is highly racialized. The relevant stereotypes about the laziness of the poor that these interventions are meant to correct are often targeted towards African Americans. The racial classification model posited by Soss, Fording and Schram (2008) makes clear that the paternalism is an intentional choice by policy makers, and they provide evidence that the racial makeup of a particular locality strongly impacts whether paternalism will be evidenced in policy

choices.

To be sure, there is some scholarly work on the way that paternalism plays out among the mass public. Baker (2014) used a survey experiment to demonstrate that support for foreign aid to African countries was highly conditional on whether Western institutions were in place to oversee the use of funds. This work is an important contribution to the connection between race and paternalism, but still fails to measure paternalism as an individual level attitude. More problematically, this work explicitly claims that racialized paternalism does not operate in American domestic politics (Baker, 2014). Baker claims "mass attitudes about race and redistribution still show sentiments of uncharitable resentment, rather than charitable pity, to dominate among American whites" (p.96). The previously cited work troubles this notion, and I aim to do so further with the following theoretical account.

Theory

Racialized Paternalism

Given the differing conceptions of paternalism, it is necessary to first take some time to explain exactly what I mean by paternalism before addressing how it intersects with racial attitudes. For these purposes, I am only considering what is deemed as "hard" or "coercive" paternalism (Dworkin, 1972). As such, paternalism must include an attempt to limit the choices or access to goods and services, of an individual or group, and a justification of this action as somehow beneficial to the individual or group. Under this definition, a campaign aimed at educating sex workers about potential dangers of their profession would not be paternalistic, because, despite the assumption that sex workers do not understand the job they undertake daily, there is no effort to limit their freedom. However, the SESTA bill passed by Congress in 2018 which effectively shut down websites used by sex workers to sell their services, with the stated goal of ensuring the safety of sex workers, would be paternalistic. This is because concrete steps are taken to limit the access and choice in order to protect these same individuals.

Paternalism should be inversely related to dispositions like individualism which venerate the power of the individual to make their own choices. It may be closely related to authoritarianism, in that both of these constructs lead to support for state intrusion into the lives of citizens. Despite this, the motivations behind these constructs are notably distinct; the paternalist does not crave government interference exclusively for order or social control, as authoritarians do (Altemeyer, 1981). Instead the paternalist desires government

interference in order to improve outcomes, driven by their judgments about the inability of their fellow citizens to succeed if left to their own devices.

General paternalism should be more common among liberals than conservatives, in that conservatives should prioritize the ability of the individual to make decisions without government interference. Similarly, since they are motivated by their desire to improve conditions for their fellow citizens paternalists should be more egalitarian than their counterparts, and should be on average lower than others on constructs like social dominance orientation, a personality trait that captures a natural preference for hierarchy. But again, general paternalism itself is not racialized, and it should be targeted equally towards all groups.

However, an examination of the historical record with regard to paternalism makes clear that race (among other identities) has very much played a role in who has been subject to paternalistic intervention at the hands of the state. Paternalism has marred relations between dominant and subordinate groups in the United States almost constantly since the nation's inception. Though chattel slavery in the U.S. stands out for its brutality and dehumanization, slavery proponents rarely noted this aspect of the practice when arguing for its continuance. Indeed, many enslavers and slavery sympathizers made the case that slave owners were engaged in the task of civilizing their human property (Ford, 2009; Genovese, 1976). In the post-Reconstruction South similar arguments emerged to explain why giving newly freed persons the ability to vote would be a fate worse than the reign of racial terror instituted in the wake of federal troop withdrawal (Smith, 1993; De Bow's Review, 1867). Many arguments along these same lines were made with regard to indigenous peoples in North America who, well into the 20th century, were forced to attend schools like Carlisle Indian Industrial School, alma mater of famed Sac and Fox Nation member and Olympic gold medalist, Jim Thorpe. These schools were founded with federal government authority with the express purpose of assimilating indigenous children into American culture which involved forcibly removing all artifacts of these children's own culture even down to their names (Trennert, 1982; Navarro-Rivera, 2006; Dawson, 2012). Even today indigenous Americans in the U.S. are officially designated as "domestic dependent nations", and maintain limited autonomy over their affairs and governance. These paternalistic approaches seemed to be targeted with surgical precision towards those at intersections of race, gender, and class. Countless women, especially Black and Brown women, were targets of forced sterilization at the hands of the state well into the second half of the 20th century. These actions again were justified in the context of eugenics with paternalistic appeals claiming to spare these allegedly morally unsound or incompetent women the hassle of child birth and care (Roberts, 1997; Beal, 2008; Kluchin, 2011). Each of these cases

involves dominant groups limiting the freedom of out-groups, while claiming to do so in the groups best interest, with little regard for the perspective of group members, who are competent adults capable of articulating their own self-interest. And all of these efforts were incredibly harmful to those on the subordinate side.

These actions were not driven by a general or non-specific paternalism, they singled out particular identities and stripped them of agency afforded to other Americans. I build on the prior work suggesting paternalism among elites is an illusion, and masks strategic motivations (Jackman, 1994; Wacquant, 2009; Soss, Fording, & Schram 2012). Despite the insincerity from politicians and policymakers, I argue that within the broader mass public these rationales can find sympathetic audiences who harbor no ill will towards these out-groups, and genuinely desire to aid the out-group. The illusion of benevolence among elites that Jackman (1994) claims is a facade for those on the subordinate side of inequality, can also serve to convince superordinate group members who subscribe to a *racialized paternalism*. This racialized paternalism has two simple but key components: a desire to improve outcomes for a group and a belief that the group is incapable of improving their own outcomes without interference. Underlying this unique disposition is an affinity for a racialized group, in conjunction with negative stereotypes about the competence and intelligence of the group. Though completely separate from animus, this framework compels support for interventions that strip power and agency from said out-group.

Notably, though judgments about the competence of an out-group are central to this construct, it is not just about the impact of negative stereotypes relevant to an out-group. I argue that the impact of these stereotypes changes when they are paired with a genuine desire to help the stereotyped group. Stereotypes about competence and intelligence should be most likely to motivate racialized paternalism, but other stereotypes such as those concerning commitment to the work ethic or propensity for violence among a group should also contribute to this construct. Given the relevance of stereotypes here, those at the nexus of several stigmatized identities (such as class, gender, sexuality and disability) are most likely to be targeted by this paternalism. Though this theory is not specific to any particular identity group or nation, in this paper I focus mainly on how it manifests in Americans who identify as White with regards to Black people.

The construct of racialized paternalism provides several important contributions to the study of intergroup attitudes broadly. First, it expands our understanding of these attitudes by probing beyond a simple like dislike paradigm that has guided much research in this area and exploring the complex and multifaceted nature of the emotions we feel toward out-groups (Clifford & Piston, 2017). In doing so it provides an explanation for public support of policies that are racially biased or discriminatory among the many majority

group members who do not express outwardly negative views of racial out-groups.³ This framework also clarifies when the adherents of this disposition, who can play a pivotal role in implementing the aforementioned discriminatory policies, will side with those who have more conservative attitudes on race. Specifically, racial paternalists will support discriminatory policy that restricts the freedom of the out-group, but only when this policy is seen as accounting for the group's shortcomings and improving the group's outcomes. Finally, the theory elucidated here underpins the logic of a novel measure of racialized paternalism towards Black people, which I explain in the next section.

Measuring Paternalism

Building from prior work I theorize that racialized paternalism is a consequential political disposition that can be measured and drives political attitudes. However, in order to test this proposition, I need to also measure a race neutral paternalism and demonstrate that the two constructs are, indeed, distinct. To accomplish this, I set out to create two batteries, one capturing racialized paternalism and one capturing a general and non-race specific paternalism. These questions should simply ask about an individual's preferred level of outside interference in the lives of private citizens from a certain group. However, these must be asked in a general fashion without specific mention of government so as not to be conflated with more ideologically aligned and affective responses to the mention of the role of government.

But these questions should still capture a belief that humans generally or members of a specific racial group are often incapable of ensuring good outcomes for themselves and it is the responsibility of the government to correct for these deficiencies through policy. I do this very simply by using two virtually identical batteries and sub in "Black people" for the more general "people" for the racialized paternalism measure. These questions are carefully crafted to avoid picking up automatic affective responses toward that out-group, or social desirability. For this reason, these questions must focus on the need for interference in the personal lives of the group and not the stereotypes that may lead to this belief. The series of questions that meet this criterion specifically with reference to African Americans, I refer to this as the Black paternalism scale. I will refer to the questions referring more generally to people as the general paternalism scale.

³For instance, Soss Fording and Schram (2008) demonstrate considerable racial bias in the application of welfare restrictions like drug tests, but this policy is popular even among a majority of White Democrats (United Technologies/National Journal, 2013; Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017)

Racialized Paternalism and Political Behavior

There is an extensive literature that suggests that when holding certain policies in mind, considerations about the group that the policy is assumed to impact automatically come to mind (Nelson & Kinder, 1996; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Perez, 2016). And there are a number of political issues in the American context that have been demonstrated to be highly racialized, and clearly linked to certain racial groups, such as welfare and crime (Gilens, 2009; Valentino, 1999; Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005; Filindra & Kaplan, 2016). When respondents are exposed to a racialized policy that restricts or limits the freedom of the target out-group and does so specifically in order to help that group, racial paternalists will be likely to support this policy. In some cases, this could be policy that is actually harmful and that these respondents might not want for themselves. Regardless, as long as a policy is racialized and it imposes restrictions or limits freedom to overcome deficiencies it should be appealing to racial paternalists.

There are a number of policies that meet this criterion. Given the racialization of welfare, interventions meant to improve the lives of individuals receiving welfare should be popular among racial paternalists (Gilens, 2009; DeSante, 2013). Policies that require drug tests or employment (e.g. workfare) for welfare recipients should be seen as necessary interventions to ensure that "deviant" Black recipients are forced to improve the quality of their own lives. These policies were a large part of the welfare reform push in the US in the 1990's that has been repeatedly linked to paternalism (Wacquant, 2009; Soss, Fording, Schram, 2011). A measure of racial paternalism towards Black people should be associated with support for these policies. In a similar manner several judges throughout the US have offered inmates reduced sentences in exchange for the inmates being sterilized⁴. The rationale offered by the judge in one such case, which mostly targeted Black incarcerated individuals, directly points to paternalism as the impetus. "I hope to encourage them to take personal responsibility and give them a chance, when they do get out, to not to be burdened with children," Judge Sam Benningfield said of his decision. A measure of racialized paternalism towards Black people should motivate support for policy initiatives along these lines, especially when the crime is clearly racialized (such as with the use of crack cocaine). Finally, marijuana use is also clearly racialized, African Americans are much more likely to go to prison for marijuana related offenses relative to their size of the population, despite the fact that they use drugs at a roughly similar rate as Whites (Wallace, Bachman, O'Malley, Schulenberg, Cooper & Johnston, 2003; McCabe, Morales, Cranford, Delva, McPherson & Boyd, 2007). Because of this racialization, racial

⁴www.washingtonpost.comwww.washingtonpost.com

paternalists should see marijuana prohibition as necessary to ensure that African American individuals do not excessively use the drug and harm their productivity and cognitive functions with it.

The exact same relationships should exist for those highest in general paternalism. They should be supportive of *any* policies that restrict the freedom of individuals in order to help them. However, for these general paternalists the same should be true even if the policy is not racialized. For instance, those highest in general paternalism should be equally likely to support a policy that taxes unhealthy substances like soda, or requires motorcyclists to wear helmets, or to oppose assisted suicide. If these general paternalists are not discriminating, they should support any paternalistic intervention regardless of target.

Similarly, demonstrating that a measure of racialized paternalism is associated with support for racialized and paternalistic policies is not sufficient to prove that the theory underlying the measurement is correct. We could see that pattern even if the measure of racialized paternalism instead captured some hidden or unexpressed animus. To rule out that possibility I test whether these measures predict support for a policy that is racialized but not paternalistic. For instance, a policy like Obamacare has been demonstrated to be tied to racial attitudes, but only through its association with President Obama (Tesler, 2012). So, unlike racial resentment, a measure of racialized paternalism should be unassociated with opposition to Obamacare.⁵ Similarly, support for the death penalty has been shown to be linked to racial attitudes in numerous studies (Peffley & Hurwitz, 2002; Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005). However, given the clear mortal consequences of this policy, it should be seen as too extreme and punitive to be helpful to the out-group. As such, a measure of racialized paternalism should not be linked with such a policy.

Even if the expected behavior is borne out with regard to support for all of those specific policies, it is difficult to completely isolate the role of race by exploring cross-sectional data. In order to conclusively demonstrate that the race is the key driver of racialized paternalism, an experiment is necessary. Returning to the instructive Detroit schools example, takeovers of largely governmental entities largely comprised of Black members have become an important tool used by state and federal authorities (Morel, 2018). From school districts to city administration to even mayors there is evidence that racial bias plays a role in when power is stripped from local governing bodies by their superiors (Morel, 2018). I argue that racialized paternalism plays a role here and stereotypes about even elites of

⁵One could make a case that Obamacare is paternalistic, but regardless, if racialized paternalism is unrelated to opposition, this provides evidence that the disposition is not capturing simple animus since racial resentment and other measures of this strongly predict opposition to Obamacare

the target out-group lead racial paternalists to believe that the group is not capable of self-governance. For this reason, a measure of racialized paternalism towards Black people should predict *increased* support for government takeovers of largely Black local governing bodies relative to support for takeovers of largely White local governing bodies. This finding would provide concrete evidence that this disposition motivates racial discrimination. However, this should not be true for the general paternalism measure, which should motivate high levels of support for the takeover with no difference by race.

Hypotheses

1. Paternalism, measured through both the Black paternalism scale and the general paternalism scale, should predict support for policies that are: a) racialized with regard to the key out-group, and b) impose some restriction/limit on freedom/behavior/or access to goods and services in order to help. This includes things like marijuana legalization, work requirements and drug testing for welfare recipients, sterilization as a punishment for mothers who use crack cocaine while pregnant.
2. Black paternalism scale should not increase support for racialized policies that are not paternalistic.
3. General paternalism scale should predict support for policies that impose some restriction/limit on freedom/behavior/or access to goods and services in order to help, when the policy is not racialized.
4. Black paternalism scale should predict increased support for takeovers of local governing bodies that are largely composed of the target out-group, relative to that of the in-group.
5. General paternalism scale should predict increased support for takeovers of local governing bodies regardless of the racial makeup of the governing body.

Study 1

Data & Methods

To get a sense of how racialized paternalism operates I fielded a survey through Turk Prime on July 17-18, 2019. The survey was restricted to Whites who were a part of the Turk Prime panel. 1800 respondents completed the survey, though 44 were dropped for

incomplete or implausible responses. The demographics of the MTurk sample are distinct from that of the nationally representative sample. This MTurk sample was more female, younger, significantly more liberal, and less educated than the respondents to the ANES and relative to the demographics of the country as a whole. Though not representative, a body of research has found that MTurk samples are still valid and can uncover similar effects as representative samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Huff & Tingley, 2015). The survey also took around 10 minutes to complete and participants were again paid \$1.50 for their time. The survey was preregistered on OSF Framework.⁶

To assess racialized paternalism in this survey I constructed the Black paternalism scale. I began adapted the general paternalism scale intended to tap a non-racialized general preference for paternalism, and made those questions specific to African Americans.⁷ I adapt these to ensure they would make sense and tap the key attitudes in question. I intentionally tried to craft questions where the socially desirable answer was not immediately clear, by asking about helping Black people even if this could result in negative consequences. After pretesting six potential items were identified as promising and employed as the measure on this survey.

After examining all six items I dropped two of the questions and combine the remaining four items into a scale. The two dropped questions had heavily skewed distributions, very few respondents answered either of the questions in the affirmative.⁸ The alpha for the scale improved from .68 to .75 when these items were dropped. Principal component analysis confirms that those two questions load heavily onto a separate factor from the other four questions.

The survey first asked respondents about their demographic information. After this, respondents answered a battery of questions about their racial and sociopolitical attitudes that included measures of stereotypes and feeling thermometers, the child rearing authoritarianism scale, racial resentment and the Black paternalism scale.⁹ After this, respondents read a fictional news article they were told was randomly selected from list of local news stories.

The news articles specifically discussed a local school board that was underperforming. In each article, the Governor of the unnamed state is quoted and advocates for a state takeover of the democratically elected school board. A member of the school board is

⁶The preregistration plan can be found here: <https://osf.io/uy7gv/>

⁷Pre-testing demonstrated that including both of these measure on the same instrument significantly altered responses, so the general paternalism scale was excluded from this survey

⁸The dropped questions were "How often should Black people be allowed to make mistakes without someone stopping them?" and "How important is it for Black people to have control over their lives, even if it results in them making poor decisions in their lives?"

⁹Question wording for all of these included in the appendix

also quoted in each article and opposes the takeover and argues that more funding for the school board is necessary to increase student achievement. There are three separate conditions and the only thing that changes in these conditions is the race of the majority of the school board and of the students who attend the schools. In the first condition, the board has a majority of White members and White students are pictured, in the second condition the board has a majority of Black members and Black students are picture and in the final, condition the race is not stated and no students are pictured.¹⁰ After they finish reading the article the respondents are asked what race the majority of the school board was, whether they support increased funding to the school board and whether they support a government takeover of the school.

Finally, respondents are asked a number of policy questions, the majority of which are paternalistic in some fashion. For the purposes of this analysis I focus on six questions. The first four are all racialized policies that should be seen to impact African Americans more than other groups. These policy items were drug testing for food stamps/SNAP/EBT recipients, marijuana legalization, sterilization as a legal punishment for women found to have used crack cocaine while pregnant and workfare for recipients of government aid. The Black paternalism scale should strongly predict support for these policies since they are both racialized and paternalistic. There final two policy items that are racialized but are not paternalistic, support for the death penalty and opposition to Obamacare. Again, racialized paternalism should be unrelated to these items since, despite being clearly tied to race, these policies are not paternalistic.


Results

I start exploring the data generated in this study with the key independent variable, the Black paternalism scale. Figure 1 displays the distribution of that scale. This includes the four remaining questions and has been normalized from 0-1. The distribution is skewed slightly to the left. The average respondent is at .42 out of 1 on the scale, and about 10% of respondents answered all four questions in a direction that indicated paternalism. Black paternalism is higher among the more religious, less educated, and younger Whites in this sample.

The psychometric properties of the Black paternalism scale indicate that it exhibits internal reliability and is not unpopular. But how does it relate to the other variables included in the study? I examine this in Table 1. This table looks at pairwise correlations between the Black paternalism scale and feeling thermometer ratings for African Ameri-

¹⁰Stimuli also included in the appendix

Figure 1: Black Paternalism Scale Distribution MTurk Sample



cans, as well as racial resentment, authoritarianism, partisan identification and ideology. The correlation between Black paternalism and the Black feeling thermometer is positive and significant at $r=.15$. This indicates that, as expected, those highest in the black paternalism scale are also likely to express higher levels of affect toward African Americans. The correlation between racial resentment and Black paternalism provides more evidence that the measure is not capturing hidden animus. The correlation between these two is negative at $r=-.20$. This suggests this measurement is picking up some disposition that is clearly not driven by animus.

The Black paternalism has a positive relationship with authoritarianism at $r=.09$, as was expected. More notably, the Black paternalism scale is unrelated to ideology, but it is negatively correlated with partisan identification. The ideology and partisan identification variables are coded such that strong conservatives and Republican identifiers are the highest value, so this means that Democrats are somewhat more likely to be high in Black paternalism than Republicans. This is an intriguing result, but the correlation pales in comparison to that of racial resentment and partisan identification ($r=.44$). This demonstrates that the Black paternalism scale is less easily conflated with partisanship and ideology than animus based racial attitude measures.

In order to determine whether the Black paternalism scale has the expected impact on policy attitudes, I look at a set of racialized and paternalistic policies. Table 2 contains a series of four ordered probit models predicting support for these racialized and paternalistic policies. All of the independent variables are again normalized from 0-1 to ensure comparability and the same is true of the outcomes, with 0 corresponding to strong opposition to the policy and 1 corresponding to strong support for the policy. Each model

Table 1: Black Paternalism Scale Correlations

	BP	BFT	RR	Auth	Party ID	Ideology
Black Paternalism		0.15***	-0.20***	0.09***	-0.10***	-0.03
Black FT	0.15***		0.12***	0.01	0.07**	0.10***
Racial Resentment	-0.20***	0.12***		0.30***	0.44***	0.48***
Authoritarianism	0.09***	0.01	0.30***		0.22***	0.26***
Party ID	-0.10***	0.07**	0.44***	0.22***		0.66***
Ideology	-0.03	0.10***	0.48***	0.26***	0.66***	

Note: Correlation table adjusts for multiple tests. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

controls for the same demographic variables, for authoritarianism, racial resentment, and Black paternalism. The first model predicts support for drug testing welfare recipients. Here Black paternalism has the expected impact, and is highly significantly associated with support for drug testing welfare recipients ($p < .001$). In the second model, predicting support for workfare for those on government aid, the same is true. The Black paternalism is again significantly associated with increased support for the policy ($p < .001$). The next policy is legal marijuana. Yet again, Black paternalism is significantly associated with the policy ($p = .03$). The final policy included in the plot is sterilization for mothers who've been convicted of using crack cocaine while pregnant. And once again the Black paternalism measure is significantly associated with support for the policy ($p < .001$). This provides considerable support for the first hypothesis. The association between Black paternalism and these policies is quite strong, and seems to point to this measure tapping the theorized construct with a high level of accuracy. Notably, the Black paternalism scale seems to exhibit impacts at least on par with and occasionally exceeding that of racial resentment and authoritarianism. This evidence provides strong support for the first hypothesis.

To further test the validity of the Black paternalism scale I turn to a second set of ordered probit models in Table 3. The two models depicted in this table predict support for the racialized but not paternalistic outcomes. These feature the same independent variables as the preceding models. Again, the Black paternalism measure should not be associated with support for these variables if it is indeed picking up on an attitude that is separate from the measures of animus that have long been shown to impact support for these policies. The first column predicts support for the death penalty. Here Black paternalism seems to be unrelated to support for the death penalty ($p = .75$), as hypothesized. The second model predicts support for Obamacare. Here Black paternalism does

Table 2: Turk Prime Models for Racialized and Paternalistic Policy Items

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.163*** (0.056)	0.006 (0.053)	−0.128** (0.056)	−0.026 (0.054)
Education	0.094 (0.165)	0.589*** (0.156)	−0.555*** (0.163)	−0.347** (0.160)
Ideology	0.603*** (0.139)	0.512*** (0.131)	−1.051*** (0.138)	0.472*** (0.134)
Party ID	0.234*** (0.078)	0.267*** (0.074)	−0.125 (0.077)	0.079 (0.076)
Pray	0.051 (0.074)	−0.069 (0.070)	−0.177** (0.073)	−0.001 (0.071)
Income	1.857*** (0.427)	1.842*** (0.401)	−0.512 (0.406)	−0.535 (0.427)
Age	0.002 (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)	−0.007*** (0.002)	−0.008*** (0.002)
Authoritarianism	0.304** (0.134)	0.358*** (0.126)	−0.270** (0.132)	0.674*** (0.130)
Racial Resentment	2.103*** (0.153)	1.495*** (0.143)	−0.225 (0.148)	1.111*** (0.146)
Black Paternalism	0.596*** (0.108)	0.665*** (0.102)	−0.232** (0.106)	1.218*** (0.105)
Observations	1,756	1,756	1,756	1,756
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

have a significant association with support for Obamacare ($p < .001$), but it is positive, increasing support for the policy. Animus based measures have been linked to opposition to Obamacare so these findings provide strong support for the first hypothesis. It seems clear, especially when considering these results alongside the negative correlation with racial resentment, that the Black paternalism scale is not capturing some latent or hidden animus. The evidence from this table is consistent with the second hypothesis.

Table 3: Turk Prime Models for Racialized Policy Items

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)
Female	0.052 (0.054)	-0.062 (0.065)
Education	0.435*** (0.158)	-0.395** (0.193)
Ideology	-0.969*** (0.134)	0.813*** (0.161)
Party ID	-0.578*** (0.075)	0.098 (0.092)
Pray	0.027 (0.071)	-0.256*** (0.087)
Income	1.068*** (0.399)	0.358 (0.500)
Age	0.003 (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
Authoritarianism	0.226* (0.127)	0.255* (0.153)
Racial Resentment	-1.374*** (0.145)	1.566*** (0.177)
Black Paternalism	0.846*** (0.104)	0.012 (0.008)
Observations	1,756	1,756

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

But this pattern of results could be explained by another phenomenon. The Black paternalism scale could be capturing a general form of paternalism, not one that is specifically targeted towards African Americans. The relationship between this measure and the racialized and paternalistic policy outcomes could be a result of some other consideration such as class that might be conflated with race. In order to test the centrality of race in driving the Black paternalism scale I turn to the survey experiment.


Again, all respondents were, after completing the sociodemographic and race related measures, made to read one of three versions of an article about a governor contemplating taking control of a (fictitious) school board due to poor results on standardized tests. The articles were identical in every way, except a brief mention of the race of the school board appeared in all but the control group, and the race was either Black or White.¹¹ If the Black paternalism scale is capturing the attitude is tapping the racialized paternalism as theorized, it should predict support for the takeover.

To explore the degree to which the Black paternalism impacts attitudes towards the school board I run a series of ordered probit regression models. I focus only on the largely Black and largely White school boards here in order to directly estimate the difference between the two. In these models, the DV is support for the takeover. I run three models, the first only includes an indicator for the Black school board treatment in order to estimate a main effect of race. The second also includes the Black paternalism scale and an interaction with the Black treatment to estimate the way that race alters the impact of the Black paternalism scale. The final model takes the independent variables from the second model and also adds both racial resentment and an interaction of racial resentment with the Black treatment. This allows for an estimation of the impact of the Black paternalism scale net of a key animus based racial attitude.

Table 4 displays the three ordered probit models estimating support for the takeover. In the first column, the estimate for the main effect of race in the experiment is negative but does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance ($p=.4$), failing to provide evidence that support for the takeover in aggregate is driven by the race of the school district. However, the second model tells a much more interesting story. As expected, the interaction between the Black paternalism scale and the Black school board treatment is positive and reaches conventional levels of statistical significance ($p=.02$), indicating that the Black Paternalism scale does predict higher support for a takeover of a Black school board than a White one. This provides strong evidence in support for the theory and the third hypothesis. But does this result stand even when considering the impact of animus based racial attitudes, long shown to predict discrimination? The final model takes on this question. Yet again, even net of the impact of racial resentment ($p=.48$), the interaction between Black paternalism and the Black treatment is positive and significant ($p=.04$), indicating that the Black paternalism scale still predicts higher support for a takeover of a

¹¹A manipulation check showed that 69% of the sample correctly identified the race of the school board in the article they viewed. Respondents were much less likely to notice the White treatment (54%) than the Black (73%) or race unstated/control (76%). Around 36% of those in the White condition thought race was unstated. I do not condition on successful manipulation to avoid a number of biases (Montgomery, Nyhan & Torres, 2018; Aronow, Baron, & Pinson, 2018)

Figure 6: Predicted Probability of Takeover Support
Turk Prime Model 3 (including RR)



Black school board than a White one. Notably the main effect of Black paternalism in both models and racial resentment in the final model is positive and significant ($p > .001$ for all), indicating that those highest in Black paternalism are more likely to support the takeover when the school is White, albeit less so than when the school is largely comprised of Black members.

To put this in context, Figure 6 presents a set of plots that graphically represents the marginal effect of Black paternalism across the treatments from the final model in Table 4 including racial resentment and its interaction with the treatment. In this figure, the red line represents the impact of Black paternalism for those who saw the White school condition and the blue line represents the impact of Black paternalism for those who saw the Black school condition, separately for each outcome in the ordered probit model. Going from the lowest to highest end of Black paternalism leads to a .1 decrease in the probability of strongly opposing the takeover when the school board is White, but leads to a .2 downward shift when the school is Black. The same change leads to a .15 increase in the probability of strongly favoring the takeover when the school board is White, and about a .25 increase when the school is largely comprised of Black members. Though the Black paternalism scale was not expected to shift attitudes for a White school board, the stronger findings for the largely Black school board are consistent with the hypothesized effect.

Table 4: Turk Prime Models Predicting Support for Takeover

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Takeover Support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Black Treatment	−0.050 (0.061)	−0.281** (0.116)	−0.198 (0.188)
Black Paternalism		0.586*** (0.168)	0.713*** (0.171)
Racial Resentment			0.739*** (0.193)
Black*Black Paternalism		0.526** (0.235)	0.495** (0.240)
Black*Racial Resentment			−0.184 (0.282)
Observations	1,173	1,173	1,173
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Study 2

The first study provides a solid body of evidence that the measure of Black paternalism is valid, the construct displays the expected discriminant validity and has a massive impact on predicted political attitudes. Most importantly I provide evidence that the disposition which is correlated with positive feeling thermometer scores from African Americans, negatively correlated with racial resentment, and as such seems to clearly be driven by affinity and not animus, still predicts support for real world discrimination. Though this work is very instructive and provides important conclusions, it cannot rule out the possibility that the measure is capturing artifacts of general paternalism not motivated by race. In order to thoroughly test this proposition, I turn to another a set of pilot study results on Amazon's Mechanical Turk.

The study was fielded in two separate waves between October 26 and November 2, 2018. The solicitation on MTurk asked for only White respondents and all non-White participants were not allowed to complete the survey and were immediately sent to the final screen¹². To address the high-profile issues with quality of MTurk samples I again implemented protocols to pre-screen suspicious IP addresses within Qualtrics and not allow respondents with these IP addresses to complete the survey (Burleigh, Kennedy & Clifford, 2018). 1000 respondents completed the survey, though 12 were dropped for incomplete or incoherent responses. The demographics of the MTurk sample are clearly distinct from that of the nationally representative sample. The MTurk sample was more male, younger, significantly more liberal, and less educated than the respondents to the ANES and relative to the demographics of the country as a whole.

The survey took around 10 minutes to complete and participants were paid \$1.50 for their time. I first asked respondents about their demographic information. After this, respondents answered a battery of questions about their racial and sociopolitical attitudes that included measures of stereotypes and feeling thermometers, competence and warmth items from Fiske, Cuddy, Glick and Xu (2002), a shortened SDO battery, the child rearing authoritarianism scale, and an original measure of paternalism including 7 questions.¹³ After this, respondents read a fictional news article they were told was randomly selected from list of local news stories. After reading the news article they answered a series of questions about the content. The news story was identical to the one used in the previous survey experiment.

For the general paternalism battery I dropped two of the 7 potential questions and

¹²These participants were still compensated for their time

¹³Question wording for all of these included in the appendix

compile a five-item scale¹⁴. Each question gets at the core beliefs around whether people generally need to be told how to behave or act in order to ensure good outcomes (ex. "How important is it to prevent people from making costly mistakes?" or "How important is it to prevent people from making poor personal decisions in their lives?"). The scale has a Cronbach's alpha of .85 indicating a high degree of reliability and a factor analysis of the items indicates that there is a one factor solution indicating that the scale is capturing one underlying construct.

Finally, respondents are asked a number of policy questions, the majority of which are paternalistic in some fashion. For the purposes of this analysis I focus on seven questions. The first four are all racialized policies that should be seen to impact African Americans more than other groups. These policy support items were drug testing for food stamps/SNAP/EBT recipients, marijuana legalization, sterilization as a legal punishment for women found to have used crack cocaine while pregnant and workfare for recipients of government aid. The wording for all of these questions was identical to the wording used in the previous survey. The last three policy items were not racialized and are more generally paternalistic, and measured support for making helmets mandatory for motorcyclists, an assisted suicide law, and a soda tax. If it works as predicted, the general paternalism scale should substantially predict support for all of these measures, since it should lead to higher support for paternalism regardless of who the target of the paternalism is.


Results

I begin examining the results of this study by looking to the general paternalism battery included in the instrument. The distribution of this variable (normalized from 0-1) is displayed below in Figure 3. This distribution is skewed to the left, with a mean of around .33, indicating that most of the respondents in this sample fall on the low end of paternalism. Notably, though it's difficult to compare across discordant samples, it appears that mean levels of Black paternalism are higher overall than that for general paternalism.

How do these variables correlate with other important sociopolitical attitudes and each other? Table 5 displays the pairwise correlations between the general paternalism measure and authoritarianism, racial resentment, social dominance orientation, party identification and ideology. It's notable that in many ways the general paternalism measure

¹⁴The questions excluded were "How important is it that people be allowed to make mistakes without someone stopping them?" and "How important is it that people be allowed to make mistakes in order to learn from them?". Confirmatory factor analysis confirms that all other factors loaded onto a single dimension and these did not. Also, Cronbach's alpha was significantly improved with its removal

Figure 3: General Paternalism Scale Distribution MTurk Sample



performs similarly to the Black paternalism scale. The general paternalism measure is positively correlated with authoritarianism at $r=.18$, indicating those highest in paternalism are also likely to be high in authoritarianism. The measure is also negatively correlated with racial resentment at $r=.12$, again indicating that the measure is not capturing racial animus. As expected, the general paternalism measure has a strong and negative relationship with social dominance orientation. This provides support for the idea that those highest in general paternalism are legitimately concerned with inequality and would like to reduce it. Finally, the general paternalism measure is weakly negatively correlated with ideology and partisan identification such that Democrats and liberals respectively are slightly more likely to be paternalistic than the rest of the sample. Additionally those highest in general paternalism are older and more religious than their counterparts, similar to the Black paternalism scale. However, there is a stark difference on education, such that those highest in general paternalism are more likely to have higher education; the opposite was true for the Black paternalism measure.

These data are instructive and sheds some light on the impact of the general paternalism measure. In order to further understand the way that paternalism shifts policy attitudes I turn to the observational analysis of support for racialized and paternalistic policy items. Again, I use the exact same questions as in the previous survey. In order to model responses, I preserve the Likert style responses and run an ordered probit model predicting support for each policy. Each model controls for the impact of socioeconomic factors and attitudinal measures (age, gender, education, income, religiosity, party ID, ideology, authoritarianism and racial resentment all normalized between 0-1). The key independent

Table 5: General Paternalism Scale Correlations

	Pater	SDO	RR	Auth	PID	Ideo
Paternalism		−0.33***	−0.12***	0.18***	−0.09*	−0.09*
SDO	−0.33***		0.23***	0.02	0.19***	0.23***
Racial Resentment	−0.12***	0.23***		0.37***	0.42***	0.61***
Authoritarianism	0.18***	0.02	0.37***		0.31***	0.40***
Party ID	−0.09*	0.19***	0.42***	0.31***		0.69***
Ideology	−0.09*	0.23***	0.61***	0.40***	0.69***	

Note: Correlation table adjusts for multiple tests. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

variable is the general paternalism measure.

Table 6 provides the results for this first set of variables. The table contains four models run separately each predicting each of the key outcomes. In the first column, predicting support for drug testing welfare recipients, we see the expected positive effect from the general paternalism measure. Higher scores on that measure significantly predict higher support for drug testing welfare recipients at $p=.05$. In the second column, predicting support for workfare for welfare recipients, this finding does not hold. The general paternalism measure is unrelated to support for workfare, defying expectations. However, expectations are met again when I turn to the third column, predicting support for legal marijuana. The coefficient for the general paternalism measure is negative and highly significant indicating increased opposition to legal marijuana as general paternalism increases at $p<.001$. The same is true with regard to the fourth column, modeling support for sterilization of inmates. Here again, the effect of general paternalism is highly significant and positive, such that those who score highest in general paternalism are much likelier to support sterilization of inmates at $p<.0001$. Overall, these findings seem to provide substantial support for the hypothesis.

The general paternalism measure does predict almost all of the racialized and paternalistic policies with the expected direction and magnitude. But is this true for paternalistic policies that are not racialized? To answer this question, I turn to the three policy items that have some element of paternalism but were not related to race. These questions asked about support for a soda tax, a law requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets, and assisted suicide. I again model responses to these questions with a set of ordered probit models, and control for the exact same variables as the previous set of models. Table 7 displays the results of this analysis. Again, the three columns represent separate models predicting

Table 6

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.398*** (0.073)	0.141** (0.070)	−0.195*** (0.075)	0.014 (0.073)
Education	0.053 (0.167)	0.351* (0.161)	−0.539*** (0.176)	−0.009 (0.170)
Ideology	1.042*** (0.203)	0.998*** (0.196)	−1.230*** (0.209)	0.447** (0.203)
Party ID	−0.081 (0.111)	0.006 (0.108)	0.180 (0.115)	−0.202* (0.112)
Pray	−0.080 (0.113)	−0.077 (0.109)	−0.281** (0.116)	−0.010 (0.114)
Income	1.897*** (0.379)	1.872*** (0.361)	−0.655* (0.381)	0.621* (0.377)
Age	−0.445** (0.180)	−0.650*** (0.176)	−0.436** (0.187)	−0.873*** (0.188)
Authoritarianism	0.761*** (0.161)	0.594*** (0.156)	−0.604*** (0.166)	0.597*** (0.162)
Paternalism	0.362* (0.189)	0.111 (0.183)	−0.743*** (0.194)	1.068*** (0.191)
Racial Resentment	2.375*** (0.201)	2.050*** (0.191)	−0.684*** (0.203)	1.694*** (0.199)
Observations	988	988	988	988

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

support for each of the outcomes separately. In the first column, predicting support for a soda tax, I again find the expected result. The coefficient for the general paternalism measure is positive and significant such that those highest in general paternalism are more likely to endorse a soda tax at $p < .001$. The same is true for the second column, predicting support for a law requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets. The coefficient for general paternalism is, once again, highly significant and positive as expected, indicating that those highest in general paternalism are more likely to support a motorcycle helmet law. This however, does not hold for the final column, predicting support for euthanasia. The general paternalism is unrelated to support for euthanasia, defying expectations. This may be because attitude on the policy is more likely to be driven by attitudes on the sanctity of life, as demonstrated by the massive predictive power that religiosity and ideology display in driving answers to this question.

These results seem to again provide solid support for the hypothesis. The general paternalism measure exhibits the expected significant impact on 5 out of the 7 policies, and the majority of both the racialized and non-racialized policies that are paternalistic. This seems to indicate that the measure is capturing a general preference for paternalism that does not discriminate on the basis of race. However, these results cannot conclusively demonstrate that this measure isn't also capturing some sort of racialized attitudes. In order to test this conclusively we must again turn to a randomized experiment that can isolate and estimate the impact of race in engendering paternalistic sentiment.

To test this specific contention, I again turn to the school board experiment. Respondents to this survey were given the exact same experiment as the prior sample. They either read a story about a largely Black or largely White local school board that was in danger of being taken over by the state government and then answered a question indicating to what degree they supported the takeover. I again use a series of ordered probit models predicting support for the takeover. I first run a model with race as the only variable, estimating the main effect of race, the next model adds the paternalism measure and an interaction to estimate the specific impact of general paternalism, and the final model drops the race treatment and includes all of the socioeconomic and attitudinal measures in order to better get a sense of the relative impact of paternalism in driving attitudes on the school takeover.

Table 8 displays the results of this. The model presented in the first column regresses Black race treatment on support for the takeover. These models only include those who saw a treatment in order to directly compare the role of race. The coefficient for the Black treatment is positive but does not reach conventional levels of significance ($p = .11$), which does not allow for rejection of the null hypothesis that treatment is unrelated to support for

Table 7

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Soda Tax (1)	Motorcycle Helmet (2)	Euthanasia (3)
Female	0.178** (0.069)	0.470*** (0.073)	−0.126* (0.069)
Education	0.391** (0.160)	−0.108 (0.166)	−0.326** (0.161)
Ideology	−0.396** (0.195)	−0.828*** (0.203)	−0.811*** (0.192)
Party ID	−0.217** (0.107)	−0.011 (0.111)	−0.078 (0.107)
Pray	0.099 (0.108)	0.100 (0.113)	−0.894*** (0.110)
Income	0.370 (0.359)	−0.019 (0.375)	0.010 (0.360)
Age	−0.473*** (0.175)	0.042 (0.183)	−0.326* (0.173)
Authoritarianism	−0.067 (0.155)	0.204 (0.160)	−0.644*** (0.157)
Paternalism	1.372*** (0.183)	1.544*** (0.194)	−0.240 (0.179)
Racial Resentment	−0.432** (0.187)	−0.122 (0.195)	−0.388** (0.188)
Observations	988	988	988

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Takeover Support	
	(1)	(2)
Black Treatment	0.131 (0.082)	0.326* (0.167)
Paternalism		2.393*** (0.306)
Black*Paternalism		-0.567 (0.435)
Observations	660	659
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

the takeover. The model in the second column tells a different story. This model includes the paternalism coefficient, which does have the expected positive and significant effect at $p<.001$, however since there is an interaction this coefficient can be understood as the impact of paternalism in the White treatment condition. The interaction of Black treatment and the paternalism measure has a negative coefficient that does not reach significance ($p=.19$), such that the impact of paternalism does not change in the Black condition. This provides strong confirmation of the hypothesized effect, paternalism drives support for the takeover regardless of condition and does not seem to discriminate on the basis of race in the way that the racialized paternalism measure does.

But how well does paternalism predict support for the takeover when other sociodemographic and attitudinal measures are included? As a final test I pool across all conditions of the experiment and run an ordered probit model predicting takeover support. Table 9 displays these findings, I control for the same set of independent variables as in the policy models. The general paternalism scale stands out among the independent variables for its predictive power. Though age and racial resentment also have a significant impact on support for the takeover, the general paternalism scale has by far the largest magnitude. A shift from the lowest to highest general paternalism levels corresponds with a .34 jump in probability of strongly supporting the takeover.

Table 9

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Takeover Support
Paternalism	1.709*** (0.187)
Authoritarianism	0.096 (0.156)
Ideology	0.252 (0.196)
Party ID	−0.024 (0.109)
Age	−0.901*** (0.178)
Pray	−0.041 (0.108)
Racial Resentment	0.794*** (0.189)
Income	−0.174 (0.366)
Education	0.053 (0.161)
Observations	988
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Conclusion

The two studies analyzed together provide substantial evidence consistent with the hypotheses. First, it is clear that a number of Whites are able to simultaneously hold positive affect for a group and still support discrimination against said group. The evidence shows that the Black paternalism scale is significantly positively correlated with feeling thermometer ratings for Black people, and negatively correlated with racial resentment, yet it still predicts support for policies that restrict the freedom of African Americans. From this finding, it seems clear that for direct racialized paternalism measures exhibit construct validity and had the expected impact on support for racialized policy. The relationships here are quite strong and almost all meet stringent tests for statistical significance in new discoveries (Benjamin et al., 2018). There is also clear and consistent evidence of discriminant validity, neither measure is associated with support for racialized attitudes that are not paternalistic.

In maybe the most intriguing result, the experimental studies demonstrate clearly that racial paternalists are significantly more likely to endorse a takeover of a largely Black school district than a largely White school district. This is true even when accounting for the impact of racial resentment in a preregistered study. This is direct evidence that racial paternalism is triggered by policies targeting the key out-group, and provides even more solid evidence that the static policy association findings are not being driven by unobserved confounder such as class or hidden racial animus. These results challenge an established consensus in the race and politics literature that animus is the motivating force behind contemporary racial discrimination.

The results with regard to the general paternalism scale similarly map onto expectations. Though the measure does predict support for the same racialized and paternalistic policies as the Black paternalism scale, this measure also predicts support for non racialized paternalistic items. And in the same experiment, those highest in general paternalism are extremely supportive of the takeover with no differences in level of support by race. These findings conclusively demonstrate that general paternalists are supportive of paternalism regardless of target, and that the general paternalism measure is capturing a notably distinct attitude from its racialized counterpart.

Some key questions remain however. I lacked the space to include the non racialized paternalistic items on the instrument with the Black paternalism scale, but I cannot say for certain that the scale would not predict these outcomes. It is still not clear what exactly is leading to the differential response to the Black and general paternalism scales and more work is necessary to tease this out. The high correlation between the two in pre-testing

raises a number of questions about how social desirability or anchoring could be adding some noise to the measurement.

Another intriguing finding is the demographic makeup of those who fall into each paternalist category. Both the Black and general paternalism measures seemed to capture more religious and younger Whites. However, more educated Whites are higher than others in general paternalism and much lower than others in Black paternalism. This is quite intriguing and unexpected. The partisan/ideological findings are also quite interesting; in the future, I would like to further explore the degree to which this disposition might have heterogeneous effects across the partisan and ideological spectrum. This is especially important for conservatives; whose ideological worldview is in many ways antithetical to paternalism.

It is also important to note that the theoretical story makes a key claim which I do not test in this manuscript. The argument rests on elites cynically deploying paternalism as a framing strategy in order to convince paternalists in the mass public to agree with them on policy. In the larger dissertation project, I provide some archival evidence that policy makers do intentionally use paternalism in their appeals for policy. I also plan to run a survey experiment testing the effectiveness of paternalistic framing in activating racialized paternalism (measured by the Black Paternalism scale) and making it even more predictive of policy attitudes. Though not direct evidence, I would argue that the patterns shown here with regard to policy attitudes are consistent with these considerations already being baked in to how Whites view these policies.

The findings presented in this paper suggest that scholars would do well to pay more attention to racial attitudes that are not rooted in animus. Racialized paternalism, despite the inattention from scholars, has a long history in the United States, and this work suggests it will continue to play a role in domestic politics. Martin Luther King Jr. famously wrote in his Letter from Birmingham Jail, "I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen's Council or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the White moderate." Racial animus seems ascendant in post-Obama America and presents many normative challenges, including a clear and present threat to the livelihood of racial minorities. But it is well worth remembering that positive feelings and good intentions with regard to subordinate groups are not sufficient to avoid similarly dangerous outcomes.

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Appendix

Black Paternalism Scale

1. How important is it to improve conditions for black people even if doing so restricts their freedoms?
 - Extremely Important
 - Very important
 - Moderately important
 - Slightly important
 - Not at all important
2. How important is it for black people to have control over their lives, even if it results in them making poor decisions in their lives?
 - Extremely Important
 - Very important
 - Moderately important
 - Slightly important
 - Not at all important
3. (DROPPED) How often should black people be allowed to make mistakes without someone stopping them?
 - All the time
 - Very Often
 - Somewhat Often
 - Rarely
 - Never
4. (DROPPED) How often should black people be kept from doing risky or harmful things that would have negative consequences for their lives?
 - All the time
 - Very Often

- Somewhat Often
- Rarely
- Never

5. How important is it to prevent black people from making costly mistakes?

- Extremely Important
- Very important
- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

6. How important is it that black people get extra help to make it in today's society?

- Extremely Important
- Very important
- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

General Paternalism Scale

1. How important is it to assist people even if doing so restricts their freedoms?

- Extremely Important
- Very important
- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

2. How important is it to prevent people from making poor personal decisions in their lives?

- Extremely Important
- Very important
- Moderately important

- Slightly important
- Not at all important

3. How often should people be told what to do with their lives?

- All the time
- Very Often
- Somewhat Often
- Rarely
- Never

4. (DROPPED)How important is it that people be allowed to make mistakes without someone stopping them?

- Extremely Important
- Very important
- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

5. How often should citizens be kept from taking legal actions (i.e. doing something that isn't against the law) that might decrease the quality of their lives?

- All the time
- Very Often
- Somewhat Often
- Rarely
- Never

6. (DROPPED) How important is it that people be allowed to make mistakes in order to learn from them?

- All the time
- Very Often
- Somewhat Often
- Rarely

- Never


7. How important is it to prevent people from making costly mistakes?

- Extremely Important
- Very important
- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

Treatments

Figure 1: Black Treatment

Gov considering state takeover of FCPS



Springdale —State legislators are considering legislation that would disband the locally elected school board in Franklin County and allow the governor to appoint an emergency manager to administer the schools.

Despite being one of the most populous counties in the state, Franklin County Schools have performed worse than the state average in both standardized test scores and graduation rates. The county and the school board are largely African American.

In a sit-down interview with WLKY, Gov. Matt Simpson said he's interested in getting better results for students and believes a takeover is the only way this is possible. "The students in Franklin County are being underserved by their school board, it's time for the state to step in and right the ship," Simpson told WKLY reporters.

Franklin County school board members pointed out that the county has some of the best performing schools in the state -- and some of the worst -- noting the gap needs to be narrowed. But they believe more resources are necessary to improve performances. "There is certainly room for improvement, but there is no reason to start from scratch here. The real problem is the lack of investment by the state in these students," Paul Brown, an at-large school board member, told WLKY.

Legislators plan to vote on the proposal to disband the school board before the end of the current legislative session early next month. Stay tuned to WLKY for more updates on this story.

Figure 2: White Treatment

Gov considering state takeover of FCPS



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Springdale — State legislators are considering legislation that would disband the locally elected school board in Franklin County and allow the governor to appoint an emergency manager to administer the schools.


Despite being one of the most populous counties in the state, Franklin County Schools have performed worse than the state average in both standardized test scores and graduation rates. The county and the school board are largely white.


In a sit-down interview with WLKY, Gov. Matt Simpson said he's interested in getting better results for students and believes a takeover is the only way this is possible. "The students in Franklin County are being underserved by their school board, it's time for the state to step in and right the ship," Simpson told WKLY reporters.



Franklin County school board members pointed out that the county has some of the best performing schools in the state -- and some of the worst -- noting the gap needs to be narrowed. But they believe more resources are necessary to improve performances. "There is certainly room for improvement, but there is no reason to start from scratch here. The real problem is the lack of investment by the state in these students," Paul Brown, an at-large school board member, told WLKY.

Legislators plan to vote on the proposal to disband the school board before the end of the current legislative session early next month. Stay tuned to WLKY for more updates on this story.




Figure 3: Neutral Treatment


 MENU



49°  Overcast / 0%  Change

Gov weighs in on possible state takeover of FCPS

Share   

 Updated: 8:26 AM EDT May 14, 2018

Springdale — State legislators are considering legislation that would disband the locally elected school board in Franklin County and allow the governor to appoint an emergency manager to administer the schools.

Despite being one of the most populous counties in the state, Franklin County Schools have performed worse than the state average in both standardized test scores and graduation rates.

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Alternate Model Specifications Study 1

Table 10: Policy Outcomes w/ Dropped Black Paternalism Q's

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.162*** (0.056)	0.004 (0.053)	-0.124** (0.056)	-0.030 (0.054)
Education	0.099 (0.166)	0.607*** (0.156)	-0.597*** (0.163)	-0.319** (0.160)
Ideology	0.602*** (0.139)	0.507*** (0.131)	-1.052*** (0.138)	0.467*** (0.134)
Party ID	0.234*** (0.078)	0.265*** (0.074)	-0.118 (0.077)	0.075 (0.076)
Pray	0.054 (0.074)	-0.061 (0.070)	-0.197*** (0.073)	0.016 (0.072)
Income	1.859*** (0.427)	1.851*** (0.401)	-0.536 (0.406)	-0.524 (0.428)
Age	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)
Authoritarianism	0.297** (0.134)	0.335*** (0.127)	-0.216 (0.133)	0.632*** (0.131)
Black Paternalism	0.585*** (0.110)	0.633*** (0.104)	-0.157 (0.108)	1.165*** (0.107)
BP Dropped Q's	0.057 (0.117)	0.181* (0.109)	-0.442*** (0.114)	0.322*** (0.112)
RR	2.095*** (0.154)	1.471*** (0.144)	-0.162 (0.149)	1.070*** (0.146)
Observations	1,756	1,756	1,756	1,756

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Death Penalty	Obamacare
	(1)	(2)
Female	−0.069 (0.053)	0.052 (0.054)
Education	−0.183 (0.156)	0.435*** (0.158)
Ideology	0.620*** (0.133)	−0.969*** (0.134)
Party ID	0.164** (0.075)	−0.578*** (0.075)
Pray	−0.294*** (0.071)	0.027 (0.072)
Income	−0.013 (0.390)	1.069*** (0.399)
Age	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Authoritarianism	0.410*** (0.128)	0.225* (0.128)
Black Paternalism	0.273*** (0.104)	0.845*** (0.106)
BP Dropped Q's	0.062 (0.111)	0.008 (0.112)
RR	1.611*** (0.144)	−1.375*** (0.146)
Observations	1,756	1,756

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12: Experimental Model Full Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Takeover Support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Black Treatment	−0.002 (0.053)	−0.140 (0.101)	−0.155 (0.167)
Black Paternalism		0.799*** (0.120)	0.893*** (0.122)
Racial Resentment			0.508*** (0.139)
Black*Black Paternalism		0.297 (0.204)	0.294 (0.208)
Black*Racial Resentment			0.039 (0.248)
Observations	1,756	1,756	1,756
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Alternate Model Specifications Study 2

Table 13: Policy Outcomes w/ Dropped Paternalism Q's

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.402*** (0.073)	0.147** (0.070)	−0.192** (0.075)	0.013 (0.073)
Education	0.067 (0.167)	0.386** (0.162)	−0.526*** (0.176)	−0.016 (0.171)
Ideology	1.034*** (0.203)	0.991*** (0.196)	−1.243*** (0.209)	0.451** (0.203)
Pray	−0.087 (0.113)	−0.089 (0.109)	−0.293** (0.116)	−0.006 (0.114)
Income	1.906*** (0.379)	1.908*** (0.362)	−0.649* (0.382)	0.613 (0.377)
Age	−0.425** (0.180)	−0.619*** (0.176)	−0.414** (0.187)	−0.889*** (0.188)
Authoritarianism	0.769*** (0.161)	0.614*** (0.156)	−0.598*** (0.166)	0.592*** (0.162)
Paternalism	1.429*** (0.204)	0.428** (0.193)	−0.542*** (0.203)	0.969*** (0.200)
Racial Resentment	2.394*** (0.201)	2.099*** (0.192)	−0.684*** (0.204)	1.695*** (0.199)
Paternalism (Dropped Q's)	0.377* (0.201)	−1.010*** (0.195)	−0.713*** (0.209)	0.330 (0.202)
Observations	988	988	988	988

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 14: Policy Outcomes w/ Dropped Paternalism Q's

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Soda Tax	Motorcycle Helmet	Euthanasia
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	0.177** (0.069)	0.147** (0.070)	0.469*** (0.073)
Education	0.385** (0.161)	0.386** (0.162)	−0.120 (0.166)
Ideology	−0.393** (0.195)	0.991*** (0.196)	−0.826*** (0.203)
Party ID	−0.212** (0.107)	−0.021 (0.108)	−0.0005 (0.111)
Pray	0.102 (0.108)	−0.089 (0.109)	0.107 (0.114)
Income	0.371 (0.359)	1.908*** (0.362)	−0.027 (0.375)
Age	−0.479*** (0.175)	−0.619*** (0.176)	0.030 (0.183)
Authoritarianism	−0.070 (0.155)	0.614*** (0.156)	0.198 (0.160)
Paternalism	1.320*** (0.193)	−0.428** (0.193)	1.429*** (0.204)
Racial Resentment	−0.436** (0.187)	2.099*** (0.192)	−0.127 (0.195)
Paternalism (Dropped Q's)	0.166 (0.192)	−1.010*** (0.195)	0.377* (0.201)
Observations	988	988	988

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: Experimental Model Full Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Takeover Support	
	(1)	(2)
Black	0.163** (0.071)	0.201 (0.386)
Paternalism		−0.055*** (0.008)
Black*Paternalism		−0.001 (0.015)
Observations	988	988
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	